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ABSTRACT
The increasing success of Eurosceptic parties in national and European elections is
undeniable. In the last twenty years, the European Union (EU) has faced economic,
social, and political crises without much time in between. As a result, we are now the
witnesses to an institutional crisis rendered even more real by the withdrawal of the
United Kingdom from the EU in January 2020. In this paper, I analyze the changes in
rhetorical strategies employed by Eurosceptic parties to gather stronger electoral support.
Many scholars have now agreed that Euroscepticism and the parties representing it have
become mainstream and accepted by the general public (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2018).
The journey to that acceptance, however, is less clear. While most agree that the crises
that shook the EU have served as catalysts of success for Eurosceptic parties, the
strategies employed to gather and use that momentum is less evident.
Based on the cleavage theory and its subsequent adaptations, I argue that the distinction
between domestic and transnational perspectives of issues can be used to understand
shifts in party rhetoric and changes in their electoral scores. I use electoral data, scores
from the Party Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2020), and original manifesto analyses
to better comprehend the rhetoric of blame and its impact on party success. My findings
suggest that the blame of transnational rather than domestic institutions for EU-wide
issues is a strategy that allows Eurosceptic parties to strengthen their core and expand
their electoral gain.
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Introduction
“The European Union will be the first death from Coronavirus,” Marine Le Pen,
leader of the French Eurosceptic party Rassemblement National (National Rally – RN),
predicted in March 2020 (France 24, 2020). She continued on, explained that the Union
had “demonstrated its complete inability to bring any reaction, solidarity, or help [to its
member states]” (France 24, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic comes as yet another crisis
shaking the stability of the European Union (EU) in recent years. In fact, there is no
doubt that Euroscepticism is on the rise. In 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) shook the
rest of Europe by voting in favour of a withdrawal from the EU, making it the first time
the EU lost a member state rather than gained one. After a very complicated and extended
period of negotiation, this is finally done: the UK has officially withdrawn from the EU
on January 31, 2020.
This, however, does not put an end to the need to study and comprehend the
phenomenon developing before our eyes. Opposition to the EU and its values has become
a mainstream and acceptable movement, after being designated as somewhat of an
extreme opinion for several years. Increasingly, politicians blame the EU for problems
that would have previously been considered domestic issues. Issues like the 2008
economic crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis have been framed as being worsened by the
EU’s lack of response. At the same time, some politicians see themselves as possible
reformers, or even saviours, of the Union and seek to rethink its role and powers.
Understanding the sources behind that growth in dissatisfaction with the EU becomes
crucial as we start to see the true consequences of the ideal of Euroscepticism. If there is
a very ample amount of resources explaining, classifying, and conceptualizing
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Euroscepticism, the question still stands: how can we explain the recent increase in
electoral support for Eurosceptic parties?
I argue that the answer can be found in a shift in rhetoric, specifically regarding
blame. As political parties increasingly regard issues as transnational rather than
domestic, they choose to blame the EU for lack of efficient action to solve these
problems. I define this new behaviour as “transnational blame,” wherein political parties
identify international institutions as responsible for a variety of crises. They may even
choose to shift the blame from the domestic government to the EU, sometimes as a way
of providing cover for that government.
Understanding this shift in rhetoric – and its larger consequences – is of drastic
importance both from a policy and a theory perspective. First, it would be impossible to
deny that the EU is in a crisis caused in part by Euroscepticism, and certainly made worse
by it. Understanding the evolution of Euroscepticism and the different ways it gathers
support becomes increasingly important in terms of policymaking. This transnational
blame may hold important implications for the EU (and other international institutions) in
the long-term, including regarding their survival and potential changes to their
functioning. On the other hand, understanding the impact of transnational perspectives of
issues on support toward the EU can serve as an addition to the theories of international
institutions and democratization. Moreover, this newly gained approach may contribute
to the academic literature and provide a new way of studying issues within international
institutions.
Historically, opposition to the EU has become more prevalent since 1979, the date
of the first direct elections to the European Parliament (EP). At the time, only a few
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countries belonged to the EU – only nine states, against the 27 members. HardEuroscepticism – that is, the complete opposition to the EU project in all its shapes – was
barely existent, and there was no parliamentary group exhibiting it. We had to wait until
1994 to see the apparition of the Europe of Nations (EN) group. This Eurosceptic
parliamentary group went through a multitude of names across the years, including
Independence and Democracy (IND/DEM) or Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
(EFDD), for instance. In 1999, this group was joined by the group Union for Europe of
the Nations (UEN), and, in 2015, the group Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF). For
the 9th Parliament, which was voted into session on the 23rd and 26th of May 2019, the
hard-Eurosceptic group took the name Identity and Democracy (ID), under the leadership
of French Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and representative of National
Rally (RN) Marine Le Pen.
Nonetheless, although these groups are easily identifiable as entities that unite
anti-EU parties from across Europe, they are not the only groups that experts have
labelled as being Eurosceptic. The much more stable European United Left/Nordic Green
Left (GUE/NGL) has existed since 1995. It exhibits forms of soft-Euroscepticism – that
is, the dissatisfaction with the current EU as it is, and the belief that it should be
reformed, one way or another. Similarly, the Europe of Conservatives and Reformists
(ECR) group, founded in 2009, also express soft-Eurosceptic ideas under an ideal that
they name “Euro-realism”. While the former focuses on ways a strong European
integration will benefit the social and environmental field, the latter criticizes the overly
centralized and ambitious nature of the EU which would like to reform into a
“community of nations cooperating in areas where they have some common interests”
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(European Conservatives and Reformists Group, 2018). The difference in beliefs of what
the EU should be is crucial and permits a better understanding of Euroscepticism as a
spectrum. Moreover, it also opens up a discussion regarding the way these parties
perceive issues, as either transnational or domestic and how they advocate for the best
ways to respond to them.
This paper considers various crises facing the EU and explores this newfound
perception of these issues as being of transnational nature and caused (or worsened) by a
transnational institution. I chose to discuss the recent crises that shook the EU in the 21st
century: the Eurozone economic crisis, the migration crisis, the institutional Brexit crisis.
I argue against the belief that “European politics is domestic politics by other means”
and, instead, suggest that there is such a thing as European politics, based on the concept
of a transnational understanding of issues.

Literature Review
As stated earlier, the study of Euroscepticism has followed its official appearance
in 1979 and has gained in richness and variety of content ever since. Several authors are
very prominent in the field, and their writing has allowed the scholarship to gain a deeper
understanding of the concept and evolution of Euroscepticism across the years. To better
explore the large body of literature that constitutes the scholarship around
Euroscepticism, I chose to divide it into two categories: the study of the ideology itself
and that of its support. My research will also rest on the cleavage theory: its origin and
subsequent adaptations are also described here.
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Euroscepticism: the study of the ideology
Within the study of Euroscepticism as an ideology, authors have chosen to adopt
various methodologies and focuses. As such, the literature offers both research papers
that study the content of party programs vis-à-vis the European project, as well as papers
that chose to analyse the behaviour of parties as expressed through the actions of
individual deputies and entire parties within and outside of the EP.
Paul Taggart (1998) started the discussion of the ideology by defining
Euroscepticism as “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as
incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration”
(p. 366). His research also questioned the nature of Eurosceptic parties and led to the
implementation of a typology based on a survey of West European parties. Taggart
(1998)’s findings consist in a typology divided into four categories: (1) single issue
parties which only exist to express Eurosceptic sentiments, (2) protest-based parties
which are in opposition to the mainstream political system and establishments, (3)
established parties which are governing parties, and (4) factions, which is the
phenomenon of a party being divided from the inside based on disagreement on European
integration (pp. 368-369). This typology has since then been modified by multiple
authors or served as a starting point for the study of more specific elements of
Euroscepticism.
Nathalie Brack (2013), for instance, engaged in research aiming to understand the
strategies of Eurosceptic MEPs. She responded to Taggart’s typology by offering a
different version of it, which she constructed through a study of a sample of party
programs. In Brack’s (2013) typology, Euroscepticism is divided into three categories:
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(1) hard Euroscepticism, which fully opposes the European project, (2) intergovernmentalism, which would rather see the EU as a forum for discussion rather than as
a political actor, and (3) utilitarianism, which suggests that the EU should only intervene
in situations where international cooperation is needed or beneficial without overtaking
domestic governments’ responsibilities (pp. 90-91).
While Taggart (1998) and other authors who followed his ideas focused on the
content of the rhetoric of Eurosceptic parties, other authors have chosen to focus on the
parties’ behaviour both outside and within the EP. After offering a different party
program content-based typology of Euroscepticism, Brack (2013) wanted to understand
the varying behaviours of Eurosceptic MPs. As such, she has also observed actions of
elected Eurosceptic MEPs as well as conducted interviews with some of them, classifying
their behaviour into three different categories: (1) the Absentee, who does not take part in
the EP sessions or the EU, and only has significant involvement on the domestic field, (2)
the Public Orator, who uses their position as an MEP to criticize the institutions through
speeches and plenary sessions, and (3) the Pragmatist who seeks compromise with other
MEPs with the intend of changing the system from within (Brack, 2013, pp. 92, 97-101).
Brack (2013)’s behavioural classification is completed by that of Benedetto
(2008), who focuses on entire parties and seeks to understand the lack of tangible results
of Eurosceptic parties' activities within the EP through a study of Eurosceptic MEPs. His
findings led him to argue that the parties’ failure to bring any significant changes to the
EU or even stimulate a significant debate is due to: (1) their size as minority groups, (2)
the heterogeneity of their beliefs which prevent inter-group consensus, (3) the existing
alliance of mainstream pro-EU group against Euroscepticism, and (4) their belonging to a
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peripheral group rather than a mainstream group (Benedetto, 2008, p. 131). His analysis
thus focuses on institutional and structural forces determining the presumable weak
results of Eurosceptical parties’ activities.
Though authors have contributed additional information to the concept of
Euroscepticism, there has been a relative consensus on its nature. As such, I use the
definition by Taggart (1998) and adapted by subsequent scholars: “the idea of contingent
or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to
the process of European integration” (p. 366).

Euroscepticism: the study of its cause and success
Following a similar desire to understand the behaviours of Eurosceptic parties,
authors have sought to understand the reasoning behind their positioning within the EP.
For instance, Marks, Wilson, and Ray (2002) questioned the ways party positioned
themselves on new issues and studied a sample of parties represented within the
European Parliament to explore their behaviour. Their research findings stated that the
three factors impacting the European integration position were: (1) the party family, with
the liberal and Christian democrats as least Eurosceptic and the extremes (both left and
right) as most Eurosceptic, (2) the attempt of the party to attract their median support,
which they judged as a rational strategy, and (3) the location of a party on the left/right
dimension, as they found that peripheral parties very commonly choose more extreme
ideologies to distinguish themselves (Marks et al., 2002, pp. 591-592).
Nonetheless, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2018) found that the peripheral argument
does not seem to hold nowadays. Their research sought to link recent crises to the growth
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of Euroscepticism through the study of expert surveys from a variety of EU states.
Among other findings which will be discussed below, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2018)
observed that Eurosceptic beliefs have become somewhat of a mainstream idea, which
should be considered a measure of success for the parties (p. 1203).
Moreover, in their research on the Eurozone crisis and the migration crisis’s
impact on divides in Europe, Hooghe and Marks (2017) proposed an extensive study of
the literature and leaned on Chapel Hill Expert Surveys and the TAN
(tradition/authority/national) vs. GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) divide to conclude
that the left-right cleavage may not fully explain the diversity of opinions regarding
European integration (p. 23). In fact, they argued that other factors, such as geographic
areas or position as the age of the party may also affect opinions of EU integration (pp.
22, 26). Hooghe and Marks (2017)’s research is discussed in further details later in this
literature review.
This finding echoes the research of Hix (1999) and Van der Eijk and Franklin
(2007) who both found the EU dimension to be unrelated to the left-right dimension. Hix
(1999) has studied the policy positions of several party families in the EU to understand
the evolution and changes in European integration through a new theoretical framework
of the European political space. This framework includes two main dimensions: (1)
integration-independence, and (2) left-right - based on two “value dimensions” (Hix,
1999, p. 73). After developing the theoretical framework, the author tested it on a sample
of mainstream party leaders and found the political market in EU politics to be somewhat
fragmented. Moreover, though there is a considerable left-right dimension in the EU
(which tends to align with domestic positions), Hix (1999) found this left-right dimension
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to be less related to the integration-independence than to a mainstream-extreme
dimension, as mainstream and major parties tend to shift toward a pro-integration
position (p. 87).
Similarly, Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) have questioned whether
discontentment with the EU could represent an opportunity for national politicians to
grow their platform, and what the likelihood of this occurring was. Their theory centres
around the metaphor of a “sleeping giant,” which could be awakened by political
entrepreneurs using the latent public opinion scepticism and the existing divisions
between voters. Their use of a ten-point scale survey on individuals’ opinions of
European unification led the authors to discover, among other findings, that attitudes
towards the EU were largely independent of the left-right dimension (Van der Eijk and
Franklin, 2007, pp. 39-41). In other words, while political parties were likely to ignore
the EU issue and attach it to a left-right dimension, the voters’ behaviour on EU
integration was not actually expressed by the party position (Van der Eijk and Franklin,
2007, pp. 33, 48).
Though these different papers show a lack of correlation between EU integration
and the left-right dimension, the literature has not fully concluded on this matter. For
instance, Marks and Steenbergen (2002) studied the evolution of political contestation in
the EU, asking whether the debate about European integration could be reduced to a
small number of dimensions and to what extent this debate might be related to traditional
cleavages (pp. 879-880). The authors answered these questions by discussing four
existing models of dimensions of contestation: International Relations Model; Hix
Model; Regulation Model; Hooghe-Marks Model (Marks and Steenbergen, 2002, p. 885).
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They found a certain correlation between the EU dimension and that of the left-right,
showing that the Left-Right dimension tends to underlie opinions on European
integration, most likely because new integration issues are simply assimilated into
existing cleavages such as the Left-Right dimension (Marks and Steenbergen, 2002, p.
889).
Furthermore, multiple authors have sought to distance themselves from the
ideologies themselves and instead focus on the outside elements that influence the growth
of Euroscepticism. In their aforementioned study, “Putting Brexit into perspective: the
effect of the Eurozone and migration crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European
states,” Taggart and Szczerbiak (2018) explain that party-based Euroscepticism can be
caused by multiple elements, including economic, social, and political factors, namely as
responses to an economic crisis, anti-immigration sentiments, concerns about democracy
and sovereignty, and nationally specific concerns (pp. 1204-1205). Their analysis focuses
specifically on the 2008 economic crisis, the 2010 Eurozone crisis, the 2015 refugee
crisis, and the consequences of the Brexit vote of 2016, but can easily be extended to
other crises.
The study itself proposes to analyse the framing of “Europe” in different cases,
showing that the EU might be described with the following factors: immigration,
economy, values, democracy, environmental policies, militarism, neoliberalism,
sovereignty, bureaucracy, democratic deficit, moral/cultural values, national issues,
women’s issues, and asylum (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2018, pp. 1199-1202). They
showed that, though each crisis has had a clearly different impact (e.g. the Eurozone
crisis impacted mostly countries affected by bailout policies; the migration crisis
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impacted post-communist states of central Europe; and Brexit has contributed to the
legitimisation of the Eurosceptic narrative), the EU’s handling of the crisis as well as the
rhetoric surrounding the events has had a tendency to increase feelings of Euroscepticism
(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2018, p. 1207).
Other authors chose to follow a similar research question and sought to
understand how crises can explain the rise of Euroscepticism. In their research on the
growth of far-right parties in Europe, Polyakova and Shekhovtsov (2016) used two case
studies (Greater Romania Party in Romania and Jobbik in Hungary) to suggest that farright parties are especially concerned by the aforementioned crises. They described the
fear of “Islamisation” of Europe, the 2008 economic crisis, the refugee crisis, and the
terrorist attacks of 2015 as catalysts of the parties’ success, emphasizing the growing
threat to the stability of the EU.
In fact, this group of issues is seen as a “triple crisis” (economic, social, and
political) by Heisbourg (2015), who studied the political impact of the Syrian refugee
crisis with the use of qualitative data describing the evolution of the asylum crisis (p. 9).
The paper narrated the crisis, pointing out the conclusions which might be taken and the
lessons that could be learnt, including the fact that the migration crisis simply served to
worsen existing tensions and issues such as economic difficulties, German hegemony,
and division between Member States (Heisbourg, 2015, pp. 10-12). Though the argument
of the paper is essentially normative rather than quantitative, Heisbourg’s
conceptualization of the “triple crisis” creates an understanding of the growing
prominence of Euroscepticism in all aspects of society.
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Many authors also chose to focus on a specific country-case to explore this triple
crisis in depth. Krzyżanowski (2017), for instance, chose to focus on a case study of
Poland to show the evolution of the Polish political discourse. He justified this choice of
case-study by pointing out the uniqueness of the country in that immigration has been
absent from the Polish mainstream discourse for years (Krzyżanowski, 2017, p. 5).
Through a study of political speeches and Tweets from the party Law and Justice (PiS),
Krzyżanowski (2017) found that anti-immigration issues are linked with larger patterns
of anti-internationalism and Euroscepticism, often popularized by the mediatization of
politics, an observation that can easily be expanded to other countries (pp. 10, 17).
In turn, in their research questioning the impact of the refugee crisis on
Euroscepticism, Benedikter and Karolewski (2017) leaned on recent interactions between
Italy and other EU member states. Their findings led them to argue that Italy was left
alone to deal with the refugee crisis, rather than receiving substantial support from the
EU. As such, this caused Italians to develop strong resentment and anti-EU feelings.
Again, this seems to be the premise of extended research developing the way states have
grown to expect a transnational response to issues they now see as transnational.
Nonetheless, there is little literature on this subject. Recently, in an effort to
understand new divides in Europe, Hooghe and Marks (2017) adapted the original
cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) to conceptualize a transnational cleavage
within parties. The cleavage separates parties encouraging the EU’s integration efforts
from those supporting national sovereignty above all else. Hooghe and Marks (2017)’s
approach could help understand Euroscepticism (and conversely, Euro-enthusiasm) from
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a transnational perspective. Their paper is discussed in detail in the “Cleavage Theory”
section of the literature review.
Harteveld et al. (2017) also demonstrated that European citizens can (and do)
make the difference between various political institutions and tend to blame the
institution responsible for a particular issue. The research focused on the refugee crisis’
impact on attitude toward the EU through a content analysis of the media and individual
survey data. Among other findings, the authors found that the salience of the refugee
crisis in the media was positively correlated with increased concerns about EU policies;
in other words, if a crisis is more mediatized, it will cause higher levels of
Euroscepticism (Harteveld et al., 2017, pp. 169-170). As stated earlier, the data also
showed that, though the asylum crisis has increased Euroscepticism in every country
overall, the level of mistrust of national political elites was less homogenous and
depended on national circumstances, which shows that EU citizens are conscient of and
understand different levels of governments (Harteveld et al., 2017, p. 172). Though the
authors focused on the refugee crisis, it seems reasonable to infer that their findings can
apply to a larger set of issues.
Based on these findings, it seems natural to wonder whether an increased
understanding of issues as being transnational would cause an increase in Euroscepticism.

Cleavage theory
In order to develop my research, I chose to analyse Eurosceptic movements
through an adaptation of the cleavage theory. Developed in the 1960s by Lipset and
Rokkan (1967), from a study of election data and survey of parties, the theory proposes
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that all European parties position themselves on one side or another of four cleavages
defined by the authors. These cleavages are centre v. periphery (which gave birth to
regionalist parties), state v. church (which divided secular parties from those aligned with
a specific religion), owner v. worker (which represents the left wing/right wing
separation), and land v. industry (which led to the appearance of agrarian parties).
Later, following historical development, some authors create other cleavages to
further understand political parties’ behaviours and ideals. Focusing on the process of
globalization, Kriesi et al. (2006) described the appearances of new cleavages in Western
Europe (p. 921). They suggest fusing Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavages into two
dimensions: a cultural (religion) dimension and a socio-economic (class) dimension
(Kriesi et al., 2006, p. 923). Through the study of new party families, the authors argue in
favour of a two-dimensional nature of cleavages and warn that new challenges, such as
those of integration, may create or deepen new cleavages (Kriesi et al., 2006, pp. 925,
949, 951).
Moreover, authors such as Kitschelt (2004) propose that parties may only be
successful based on the combination of position on two or more dimensions of cleavage
(p. 17-19). Such findings are based on research questioning the changes in party systems
in recent democracies and supported by surveys of parties in democracies of the Global
North and individual survey data.
More recently, as stated earlier, Hooghe and Marks (2017) have chosen to explore
the European crises through Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage theory,
conceptualizing a transnational cleavage and analysing the crises from that specific lens.
Hooghe and Marks (2017)’s paper entitled “Cleavage Theory Meets Europe’s Crisis:
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Lipset, Rokkan, and the Transnational Cleavage” forms the basis of my theoretical
framework. Hooghe and Marks (2017) assess the newly formed transnational cleavage as
a response to reforms leading to increased globalization. In particular, they affirm that the
Eurocrisis and the migration crisis were critical instances for the emergence of the
cleavage (Hooghe and Marks, 2017, pp. 4, 13-14). A survey of experts in the field leads
the authors to understand that the cleavage is mobilized by new parties and nonmainstream parties, especially from the radical right, since it is very rare for established
mainstream parties to be able to change their positioning at the level of conflict
dimension (Hooghe and Marks, 2017, pp. 16-17). Thus, the new cleavage is embodied by
new political parties who tend to be actors in the creation of social divisions rather than
subjects to existing divisions (Hooghe and Marks, 2017, p. 7). As an addition, recent
surveys showed a sharp decline in support for moderate parties, which confirms the
author’s hypothesis that new, non-mainstream parties are becoming increasingly
important (Hooghe and Marks, 2017, p. 22).
To finish, Hooghe and Marks (2017) describe the most active pole of the
transnational cleavage as connecting various positions, including defence of national and
western values, defence of national sovereignty, opposition to immigration, and trade
scepticism (p. 11). Still, this does not put only radical right parties on the one extreme of
the transnational cleavage (Hooghe and Marks, 2017, p. 24). Indeed, using the TAN vs.
GAL cultural dimension model, the authors assess that the transnational cleavage is
represented on both poles of the dimension but that separate regions of Europe have
called to different political groups to express this new divide. Notably, while Western
Europe has used the GAL vs. TAN dimension as an extension of the economic left vs.
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right cleavage, Eastern European countries have called to the TAN pole to express their
disagreement with transnational changes, and Southern European countries showed
support for the GAL pole for a similar purpose (Hooghe and Marks, 2017, pp. 24-26).
Hooghe and Marks’s theoretical framework will serve to create and refine the theory used
in this paper.

Summary
The body of literature on Euroscepticism has shown us that Eurosceptic parties
are growing in scope and importance within European institutions. Authors have
highlighted social, economic, and political crises as potential causes of the recent growth.
In turn, Euroscepticism has been painted as both cause and consequence of a new divide
in society, between those who support globalization and those who would prefer putting
national interests first. Hooghe and Marks (2017)’s transnational cleavage is one way of
illustrating this cleavage. Still, though we know this new cleavage through its theoretical
uses and characteristics, we can still question how the cleavage is expressed and how it
presents itself in party rhetoric. Furthermore, with the aim of better understanding
Eurosceptic growth, I propose to analyse how the transnational cleavage impacts party
success.

Theory
The knowledge constituted from the rich body of literature about Euroscepticism
paints the picture of a growing movement caused by a multitude of crises within the
European Union. While this indicates that recent crises – economic, social, political, and
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institutional – have had a role in causing the growth of Eurosceptic parties, the need for a
systematic review of this causation is still present. This research seeks to respond to the
following question: how can we explain the recent increase in electoral support for
Eurosceptic parties? Based on the cleavage theory conceptualized by Lipset and Rokkan
(1967) and subsequently adapted by other scholars, as well as on the findings of Hooghe
and Marks (2017), I suggest that a transnational understanding of issues is followed by an
increase in Euroscepticism. In particular, I propose that a shift in blame within parties’
rhetoric (in favour of blaming transnational rather than domestic institutions) will be
followed by higher success for these parties.
My theory is based on the understanding that increased transnational blame (x)
causes an increased support for Euroscepticism (y). Taking into account that transnational
issues are becoming more and more salient in the domestic level, these issues become
increasingly present in party’s rhetoric and in voter’s minds. As per Hooghe and Marks
(2017), the world sees a growing push against globalization and international institutions
with the understanding that it is more prudent to prioritize the well-being of nation-states
rather than the expansion of international alliances. As such, voters might be more
convinced by Eurosceptic ideas and rhetoric, which suggest that the EU might be hurting
the nations’ best interests. Instead of blaming the domestic government for a failure to
address issues of importance to voters, it becomes increasingly easy for Eurosceptic
parties to turn the blame for crises onto the EU.
The rationale behind this is the fact that the EU has put into place multiple
institutions that transform domestic issues into transnational ones. For instance, and in the
case of immigration, institutions such as the Schengen Area, the Common European
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Asylum System (CEAS), and the Dublin Convention contribute to making immigration
and asylum issues into transnational matters. Similarly, financial instability can be
analysed from a European perspective, especially given the numerous commercial and
financial agreements within the EU (including that of the Eurozone) as well as
institutions like the European Central Bank (ECB). The Schengen Area and the European
External Action Service (EEAS) make foreign security and the response to terrorist threat
a European-wide responsibility. The list can go on.
My theory proposes that, as Eurosceptic parties turn to blaming the European
Union for a variety of crises, their electorate becomes more intrigued – and even
convinced – by their message, which allows the parties to grow in influence and
importance.
The first concept upon which my theory rests (x) is that of transnational blame as
interpreted from Hooghe and Marks (2017)’s conceptualization of the transnational
cleavage which “has at its core a cultural conflict putting libertarian, universalistic values
against the defence of nationalism and particularism” (p. 22). Per their research, “the
most active pole of [the transnational] cleavage connects national and western values,
defence of national sovereignty, opposition to immigration and trade scepticism”
(Hooghe and Marks, 2017, p. 11). I conceptualize transnational blame as another
expression of Hooghe and Marks (2017)’s transnational cleavage in which parties choose
to see crises as being inherently transnational. Transnational blame thus consists in
framing issues as being caused or worsened by international institutions or the
international system. It functions as a rhetorical strategy entailing a shift from domestic
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blame (of national government, opposition party, structural issues, etc.) to transnational
blame and aiming to increase popular discontentment with international structures.
The second concept (y), that of Eurosceptic party success rests on the definition of
Euroscepticism, as coined by Taggart (1998) and adapted by subsequent scholars: “the
idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and
unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (p. 366). Further
discussion of the concept of Euroscepticism was addressed in the literature review of this
paper. The growth of Euroscepticism – and thus, the success of Eurosceptic parties – is
studied in several research articles aforementioned including Brack (2013) and Taggart
and Szczerbiak (2018). The latter one raises the observation that “Euroscepticism has
shown that it has the capacity to enter the political mainstream and to become a position
adopted by parties of government” (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2018, p. 1203). I choose to
look at the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties as a sign of political success for
Eurosceptic ideas.
To explain the causal relationship between transnational blame (x) and growth in
support for Euroscepticism (y), I rely on studies of the impact of political rhetoric on
voters’ behaviour. Though a majority of the body of literature focuses on political
campaigns in the United States, I chose to assume that the psychological effect of these
campaigns is similar in European politics and that “campaigns fundamentally shape
voters’ decisions” (Druckman, 2004, p. 577). As such, my research is based on the
assumption that political rhetoric has the capacity of persuasion, that is: “the extent to
which political messages are able to alter citizens’ attitudes, and thereby shape their
behavior” (Motta and Fowler, 2016, p. 3). I also chose to acknowledge rhetoric as playing
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a major role regarding the intensity of a crisis. Though crises might be felt differently in
various countries, if a party rhetoric presents the crisis as being of high intensity, the
electorate will respond to it based on the rhetoric, regardless of its objective intensity
(Harteveld et al., 2018, p. 172).
From these assumptions, I construct my causal mechanism as follow: as
Eurosceptic parties change their rhetoric and turn to a blame of transnational institutions
in their official communication, voters become more persuaded to support a Eurosceptic
platform in elections.
Table 1 below showcases the different possible results of a domestic blame or a
transnational blame. My theory proposes that transnational blame causes an increase in
Eurosceptic party success. Nonetheless, Table 1 proposes explanations for all possibilities
and offers explanations if my hypothesis were to be nullified by the data.
Eurosceptic Party Success (y)
LOW PARTY SUCCESS

HIGH PARTY SUCCESS

NO TO LOW
BLAME ON
TRANSNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS

A potential blame on
domestic government is
upsetting to nationalist
voters

This expresses a low level of
trust for the national
government. The Eurosceptic
party is a way for voters to
protest against their national
government

HIGH BLAME ON
TRANSNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS

Voters might be attached
to the EU institutions and
believe that crises can be
resolved through further
expansion

This is my hypothesis:
transnational blame helps
Eurosceptic parties grow their
support base

Transnational
blame (x)

Table 1 - Causal relationship between transnational blame and party success

In particular, the table does pose the problem of transnational blame leading to
lower Eurosceptic party success. I explain this potential electoral result as being a call for
further expansion of the EU. An insufficient response to a crisis might be pointed by
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some policymakers as an argument in favour of a more federal EU. For this reason, I’d
like to bring an extra nuance into my research by regarding soft Eurosceptics as two
factions rather than one united ideology. I propose to understand soft Eurosceptics as
either: (1) pro-European federalists who want the EU to be more powerful, in order to
efficiently respond to crises, or (2) inter-governmentalists who wish for the EU to be a
forum of discussions rather than a deciding political actor. For the purpose of this
research, I loosely base this cleavage on the divide we see between the EP’s ECR and
GUE-NGL. Nonetheless, research would benefit from an empirical demonstration of this
nuance within soft-Euroscepticism, which could constitute a later project. For the purpose
of my research, I address both hard Eurosceptic and inter-governmentalist Eurosceptic
parties as my units of interest.
In summary, following Hooghe and Marks (2017)’s observation of a growing
transnational cleavage in the EU, I hypothesize that parties may choose to blame the EU
for taking away their country’s sovereignty or for failing to respond to the crises
adequately, instead of blaming their domestic government. I trust that this increased
tendency to blame the EU might be observable on official party rhetoric, such as party
manifestos, with growing anti-EU rhetoric focused on regarding the EU as responsible
for crises like the 2008 economic crisis or the 2015 refugee crisis. Based on Taggart and
Szczerbiak (2018)’s findings that Euroscepticism is becoming mainstream and more
appealing to voters, I further hypothesize that the parties’ strategy to put the blame on the
EU rather than on their national government might show results in the form of electoral
gains in the EP elections.
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H1: If parties increase their level of transnational blame in their official
rhetoric, they will receive a greater amount of electoral support in EP
elections.

Research Design
Following this hypothesis, I have chosen to represent my independent variable,
the level of transnational blame (x), through a study of party manifestos. The population
for that variable is the entirety of party rhetoric, but for this research, I relied on a sample
of party manifestos selected based on researcher’s skills and data availability. For my
dependent variable, electoral support (y), I have chosen to look at a sample of election
results among the population of all EP elections since 1979. In particular, I am collecting
data on the following EP elections: 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019. For the study of my
hypothesis, my unit of analysis is political parties. I measure their amount of
transnational blame through their manifestos (x) and see its impact on their electoral
gains in EP elections (y) through a quantitative analysis.
Since my independent variable is measured through the study of manifestos, I
need to pick specific parties to serve as my sample. Due to data availability and skills of
researcher, I selected political parties from the following countries: France, the United
Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, and Poland. Based on data previously gathered by various
researchers (including Pahre et al., 2014) as well as the PopuList (Rooduijn, 2019), I
created a list of Eurosceptic parties from these five countries. Through that list, I was able
to select the manifestos which I wish to study based on data availability from the
Manifesto Data Project (Volkens et al., 2020). I also only selected parties that have

22

existed and participated in at least two EP elections between 2004 and 2019, as to be able
to complete a full analysis of these parties, including with the change in rhetoric from one
election to the other. This eliminated any political party that has only participated in one
EP election before being disbanded. Based on those criteria, I have selected the following
sample of Eurosceptic parties:
•

United Kingdom: Brexit Party (Brexit); Conservative Party (Con); Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP); Sinn Fein (SF); UK Independence Party (UKIP)

•

Republic of Ireland: People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA); Sinn Fein (SF)

•

France: French Communist Party (PCF); La France Insoumise (FI); Left Front
(FdG); National Front/Rally (FN/RN)

•

Spain: Galician Nationalist Block (BNG); Podemos (Podemos); United Left (IU);
Voice (Vox - V)

•

Poland: Law and Justice (PiS); League of Polish Families (LPR); Self-Defense of
the Republic of Poland (SRP)
For the statistical analysis, I considered the following parties as the same unit:

UKIP and Brexit, and FdG and FI. In the case of UKIP and Brexit, I considered that the
departure of several UKIP MEPs to join the Brexit Party, as well as the fact that the
Brexit Party was formed by Nigel Farage – UKIP’s “greatest electoral asset” – hint as a
continuation of UKIP’s legacy in the Brexit party (Walker 2019; Osborne 2019).
Similarly, for FdG and FI, I understood the presence of MEP Jean-Luc Mélenchon on all
ballots (2009 and 2014 for FdG, 2019 for FI) as a similar continuation of ideas under a
different party name (Castaño Tierno 2018; Laïreche 2016).
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On the other hand, I have chosen to study the party’s success in EP elections in
2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 for two reasons. First, Hooghe and Marks (2017) discuss the
emergence of transnational cleavage and base their observation upon recent years. As
such, it would be counter-intuitive to try to identify the cleavage in a time where it might
not have existed yet. Similarly, my research aims to understand the current and
continuous growth of Euroscepticism, which requires a study of contemporary parties.
Secondly, studying the aforementioned elections years allow me to account for the recent
crises shaking the EU. In particular, I acknowledge each year as follow:
2004: baseline
2009: response to the Eurozone economic crisis
2014: response to the growing refugee crisis
2019: response to the political and institutional crisis caused by Brexit
I expect to see a change in rhetoric preceding these elections with an increased amount of
the manifestos devoted to discussing these crisis – and their causes. Based on my
hypothesis, I also anticipate a potential change in electoral results following these
changes in rhetoric.
As stated, my independent variable is the change in transnational blame as
measured by party manifesto content. In order to find quantifiable data, I relied on the
Manifesto Data Project (Volkens et al., 2020) which provides a systematic study of
manifestos under the form of quantitative data. I used the following indicators such:
Internationalism Positive and Negative ([107], [109]), and European Union Positive and
Negative ([108], [110]).
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Electoral results stand as my dependent variable (y), which I expect to change
based on the level of transnational blame (x). I collected the electoral scores of my
sample of parties directly from the reports of the European Parliament. Though the EP
tends to emphasize the number and percentage of seats allocated to each party, I collected
the data specifically on the percentage of national votes in support of a given party to
account for vote share rather than seat allocation. As stated, I reported on these electoral
scores for my party sample and for the four elections I have chosen: 2004, 2009, 2014,
2019.
Based on that data collection process, I obtained for each year and each party two
numbers: (1) one measuring the level of transnational blame and (2) one representing its
electoral success. I ran statistical analyses of the data to identify potential correlation and
its strength. I searched for correlation both between x and y values and between their
difference. The existence of a correlation would allow me to reject H0 and potentially
confirm H1.
Following the confirmation of H1, I worked on finding a model representing the
relationship between (x) and (y). In other words, I ran further analyses to represent,
quantitatively, the way transnational blame influences electoral success. In particular, I
worked on a model quantifying the variation in transnational blame in a given manifesto
x (corresponding to an electoral result y) and the blame in the previous manifesto x-1
(corresponding to the previous election results y-1) and its relationship to the variation
between y and y-1. A potential way of representing the relationship could be as follow:
y = a ⋅ y-1 + b ⋅ x + c ⋅ (x - x-1)
(with a, b, and c being coefficients to be determined by statistical calculations)

25

The model above represents the electoral results of a Eurosceptic party for a given
election based on knowledge of previous electoral results and level of transnational blame
shown by that party.
Upon completion of the statistical analysis, I complemented this quantitative
study by adding my own observation of manifestos, especially when it comes to the
distinction in the tendency to blame domestic or international institutions, which is
unfortunately not an indicator used by the Manifesto Project Database. To that end, I
performed an original study of sampled manifestoes and research certain keywords (or
their translations when it is relevant) including but not limited to: “European Union”
“Europe” “European” “Euro” “Eurozone” “Schengen” “Commission” “Maastricht”
“Lisbon” “European bureaucracy” “Brussels” “Elite” “Merkel” “Sovereignty”
“Democratic Deficit.” I have selected these keywords to permit an easy identification of
any reference to the EU, whether neutral or negative (in the case of “Brussels,” which
tends to have a negative connotation, for instance). This analysis allowed me to identify
patterns in transnational blame rhetoric, as well as permit me to study more complex
elements such as the shift from an economic-focused blame to a more social one between
2009 and 2014. Similarly, this qualitative analysis also showcased the strength of
transnational blame and the level to which it is implied or directly stated by various
parties.

Analysis
The analysis of data collected from the Manifesto Data Project (Volkens et al., 2020)
allowed me to highlight some interesting relationships between variables. In particular, I
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chose to substitute the transnational blame scores for indicators 109 and 110, defined by
the Manifesto Data Project as follow:
•

109 Internationalism Negative: “Negative references to international co-operation.
Favourable mentions of national independence and sovereignty with regard to the
manifesto country’s foreign policy, isolation and/or unilateralism as opposed to
internationalism.” (Volkens et al., 2020)

•

110 European Community/Union Negative: “Negative references to the European
Community/Union. May include: opposition to specific European policies which
are preferred by European authorities; opposition to the net-contribution of the
manifesto country to the EU budget.” (Volkens et al., 2020)
I decided to perform my quantitative analysis with these two indicators due to

their close relation to a potential “transnational blame” indicator, which unfortunately
does not exist in the Manifesto Data Project. Nonetheless, I found that “negative
references to international co-operation” and “opposition to specific European policies”
are very likely to happen in the presence of blame targeted at international institutions.
Indicators 109 and 110 are referred to as S109 (score 109) and S110 (score 110)
in the statistical analysis. I also included derived variables including D109 (difference
109) and D110 (difference 110) which stand for the numerical difference between the
score for a given manifesto and the previous one. Similarly, the independent variables
EP, DEP, EP-1 and DEP-1 all stand for some variation of the party’s electoral results in
the European Parliament. EP stands for the electoral score received on a given election,
DEP for the difference between the score for a given election and the previous one, EP-1
for the score of the previous election, and DEP-1 for the difference between the score for
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the previous election and the one even before that. Based on these different figures, and
though I have collected data for 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019, I constructed my table and
analysis by showcasing the election results for 2014 and 2019 to allow for the calculation
of DEP and DEP-1 which would not be available for 2004 and 2009.
An important issue that arose during the data collection and analysis was that of
data availability. Unfortunately, the Manifesto Data Project does not study all manifestos
but only those of parties with some electoral importance domestically; in other words,
they only touch on successful political parties, which reduced the amount of usable data.
In order to have a significant data analysis, I have chosen to calculate the scores for 2014
and 2019 together. Though this removes the existing control variable based on election
particularities (as a particular result may be due to an event occurring prior to a given
election), this made the statistical analysis possible. During my study of the data, I have
also noticed that S109 and S110 were quite often given a null score of 0.00 (50% of
available scores are 0.00 for both S109 and S110). The validity of these null scores could
potentially indicate the need for further study of the manifestos, especially for parties that
are well known for their negative rhetoric toward international co-operation or the EU.
Figure 1 compares S110 to electoral results (for all four elections). The high number of
dots situated exactly on the y-axis illustrate the issue with these null scores.
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Figure 1 Scatterplot S110 v. EP for 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019

I chose to pursue two analyses: one with inexistent data replaced by the median of
all available scores (S109 and S110) and the second one with only the available scores.
The ensuing statistical analysis presented two low to moderate correlations
between dependent and independent variables. In particular, Figure 2 showcases the level
of correlation calculated between the chosen variables. I was specifically interested by
the correlation of 0.3 between EP and S109 as well as the correlation of 0.42 between EP
and S110. This indicates that there may be some link between negative references to
international co-operation (or the EU) and electoral results for a given party. It is also
important to note that S109 and S110 are somewhat correlated (0.37), which is not too
much of a surprise given that they score quite similar phenomena. In other words, a
negative view of international co-operation may be paired with a negative view of
European integration. Similarly, positive references to national sovereignty might be
present in both Internationalism Negative and European Union Negative.
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Figure 2 Level of correlations between the chosen variables

Further statistical analysis and calculation of p-values revealed some more
information about the data, as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. In particular, though the
confidence interval for Pearson’s correlation between EP and S109 included 0 (and thus
did not permit for H0 to be rejected), a calculation of Kendall’s correlation resulted in a
tau superior to 0.3 and a low p-value (0.04). This could indicate that EP and S109 vary in
the same direction, which might confirm my hypothesis that, as transnational blame
increases, so do party electoral scores.
Figure 5 showcases the potential correlation between S109 and EP. It is notable,
as stated before, that the values are quite scattered and cannot confirm a strong
correlation between the two variables.
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Figure 3 Graph of the relationship between EP and S109

In the case of S110, however, I was able to confirm a correlation through
calculations shown in Figure 6. Indeed, a calculation of Pearson’s correlation indicated
with a 95 percent confidence interval that the true correlation is 0.41*. It confirmed that it
is not equal to 0 and is positive interval: 0.017 and 0.703. As such, I can affirm with a 95
percent confidence that there is a correlation between negative references to the EU and
electoral scores at the European Parliament. Since S110 is a stand-in scoring system for
transnational (in particular EU) blame, the existence of the correlation between S110 and
EP might be reflected in the study of my original data. In other words, the correlation
between S110 and EP could indicate that my hypothesis that levels of transnational blame
impact electoral results can likely be confirmed.
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Figure 7 showcases the correlation between S110 and EP. One notable outlier
(16.47;26.77) represents the score and electoral results for UKIP in 2014. This could cast
some doubt upon the reliability of this datum, as all other S110 figures are scored
between 0.00 and 6.00. Nonetheless, even with the exclusion of this datum, I can still
confirm with a 95 percent confidence that there is some correlation between S110 and
EP.

Figure 4 Graph of the correlation between EP and S110

After confirming the existence of a correlation between S110 and EP (hinting at a
correlation between transnational blame and electoral results), I attempted to calculate a
model aiming to predict electoral results based on known manifesto scores. As stated
earlier, I worked on two models: one with imputed data (replacing all non-available data
with the median of available data) and one with only the available data.
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A first regression analysis of the data (with imputed data where it was nonavailable) showed the calculation results in Table 2. The resulting model proposed to
calculate EP based on EP-1, S109, and D110. The very low (i.e. smaller than 0.001) pvalue of F-statistic indicated that H0 may be rejected and that the addition of the variables
contributed to improve the fit of the model significantly. Thus, the model is as follow:

EP[n]=0.43+0.84×EP[n−1]+5.39×S109+1.7×D110
It indicates that a party’s electoral result for a given election is dependent upon
previous electoral result and tends to increase with S109 and D110. In other words, the
higher the score for negative references to international cooperation are, the higher the
party results will be. Similarly, as negative references to the EU increase (compared with
the previous manifesto), so will the electoral score the party obtains.
The second regression analysis (with only available data) showed the calculation
results presented in Table 3. The resulting model is quite interesting for my analysis.
Indeed, like for the previous one, it suggests calculating the results of a given election
based on EP-1, S109, S110, and D110. Again, the very low p-value of F-statistic allowed
me to reject H0 and confirm that the model is significantly improved by the overall
addition of variables. The model is as follow:

EP[n]=4.2+0.76×EP[n−1]+15.63×S109−2.28×S110+2.8×D110
An important point to note is the high coefficient linked to S109 (equal to 15.63).
This serves to indicate that the level to which a party negatively refers to international
cooperation (or positive reference to sovereignty and isolationism) is highly relevant in
the calculation of the party’s electoral score. In other words, the more a party advocates
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for more isolationism and criticizes international co-operation (and the more they
increase their rhetoric anti-EU), the higher the score they will receive in elections.
Another interesting part of this model is the negative coefficient associated to
S110, which seems to indicate that, the more a party refers to the EU in a negative light,
the lower the score they will receive. However, since I have found a correlation between
S110 and EP, I can safely argue that this is not the case. Instead, I interpret this negative
coefficient in light of the existing correlation between S109 and S110 (0.37). This gives
insight in the global contextual behavior of the model and shows that S109 and S110
reinforce or compensate for one another. In other words, there might be an existing limit
on the level of Internationalism/EU negative references and, as one of the indicators
reaches that limit, the other must compensate by decreasing. This could be illustrated by
the understanding that if a party makes a very high amount of negative references to
international co-operation in general, it might not need a similarly high number of
negative references to the EU to properly communicate a message against international
co-operation.
This statistical data provides me with the ability to reject H0 and, instead, confirm
that transnational blame does have an impact on party success. In other words, this
analysis highlights and confirms the new pattern of blame that I have identified and
described thorough this paper. Parties are increasingly making use of this new rhetorical
strategy and painting international organizations – and in particular the European Union –
in a negative light. In return, it seems that this strategy pays off, as these negative
references are correlated with higher electoral success. To the extent that this pattern
persists, I expect Eurosceptic parties to continue receiving an increasingly higher vote
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share. Understanding this pattern becomes crucial in the study of the growth of
Euroscepticism. Similarly, those findings can also prove useful from a policy perspective.
The success of parties that constantly condemn the failures of international organizations
may actually highlight the need for communication to be changed on the side of these
organizations as well. Clear communication of the European Union’s successful
endeavors might prove an efficient answer to the growing pattern of transnational blame.

Illustration
After demonstrating the relevance of transnational blame in the rhetoric of a
political party, it is interesting to see how it takes shape and the language it adopts. Here,
I showcase the use of this rhetoric of blame in the case of the Rassemblement National
(formerly Front National), a French far-right party that has built its platform on antiimmigration and anti-EU ideas. I sampled four manifestos: that of 2002, 2007, 2012, and
2017 (all French presidential election years) to collect examples of transnational blame
being used.
The 2002 Front National manifesto acts as an excellent baseline for my analysis.
Though it is very heated in its criticism of the EU, it mostly reflects on the European
integration project rather than on specific actions by the EU. It clearly fixes its
positioning on the transnational cleavage described by Hooghe and Marks (2017) by
emphasizing the importance of national sovereignty and its disagreement with any form
of international organizations. At the same time, though, I found a lack of specific blame,
replaced rather by a fundamental disagreement with the identity of the EU.
“L’Europe de Bruxelles est une prison pour ses peuples. - Brussels’
Europe is a prison for its people.” (Front National and Le Pen, 2002)
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“La Nation est, pour tous les Français, le cadre naturel de leurs libertés et
de leur souveraineté. Toutes les atteintes portées à ces dernières seront
remises en cause : Convention de Schengen, traités de Maastricht et
d’Amsterdam, ‘Nouvel Ordre Mondial’. Si elle n’obtient pas la protection
de ses intérêts, la France sortira de cette Europe-là. – The nation is, for
all French people, the natural setting of their freedom and sovereignty. All
violations upon the latter will be challenged: Schengen convention, the
treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, the ‘New Global Order.’ If it
doesn’t obtain the protection of its interests, France will leave this
Europe.” (Front National and Le Pen, 2002)
A specific case of blame denounced by Jean-Marie Le Pen’s 2002 Manifesto is
that of the lack of action by European scientific institutions in dealing with the mad cow
disease (BSE) in due-time and endangering the populations by failure to take action.
“D’autres organismes et comités ‘scientifiques’ fonctionnent au niveau
européen: ce n’est qu’en 1996 que la commission européenne a commencé
à se pencher sur l’interdiction d’exportation du boeuf britannique alors
que le problème était connu depuis 1986. – Other ‘scientific’ organisms
and committees function at the European level: only in 1996 did the
European Commission start to consider the interdiction to export British
beef, even though the problem was known since 1986.” (Front National
and Le Pen, 2002)
Similarly, though the Front National warns that the EU will endanger French
interests, there is no real blame besides the BSE as mentioned above. All attacks are
predictions based on fears that the EU might protect its own interests rather than France’s
and, as such, cause issues. Nonetheless, concrete examples are rare.
The 2007 manifesto is similar in its relative absence of specific attacks and blame
against the EU, primarily since a vast majority of the manifesto focuses on propositions
for the presidential program rather than a more detailed description of the party’s view.
Nonetheless, I still noted a blame on the EU with regards to its agricultural politics
which, the FN says, endangered French farmers by forcing them onto a dishonest and
competitive global market.
36

“Depuis plus de 20 ans, les pouvoirs ont décidé de mener, via notamment
Bruxelles, des politiques de baisses massives des protections douanières
du territoire français et européen. C’est un choix politique qui a été fait et
que les paysans ne discutent pas. Mais ce choix a entraîné pour eux une
concurrence déloyale. En effet, pendant que le monde agricole français et
européen est soumis aux coûts de la protection environnementale, du bienêtre normal des animaux, des salaires européens et de la protection
sociale européenne, les produits arrivant du Pacifique sud ou du Brésil,
eux, n’ont pas ces coûts. – For twenty years, the power have decided to
lead, notably from Brussels, politics of reduction of custom protections on
the French and European territory. This is a political choice, against which
farmers do not argue. Still, this choice has led to unfair competition for
them. Indeed, while the French and European agricultural world is subject
to the cost of environmental protection, well-being of animals, European
salaries, European social protection…, the products coming from the
South of the Pacific or Brazil are not subject to those costs.” (Front
National and Le Pen, 2007)
This criticism is also followed by that of the European politics of immigration.
This is, however, not a surprise given that the FN has historically built its platform
around the opposition to any form of immigration, especially from developing countries.
Moreover, though it does blame the EU for a lenient attitude vis-à-vis undocumented
immigration, the manifesto also points to the domestic government for a very similar
behavior.
“La Commission refuse d’enfermer l’Union européenne dans des
frontières fixes […].
Face à l’arrivée massive de clandestins sur tout le territoire européen, la
Commission européenne a décidé de créer le 3 octobre 2005, FRONTEX,
une agence européenne de gestion des frontières extérieures de l’UE.
C’est un gadget coûteux et dérisoire. […]
Toutes ces directives [immigratoire européennes] (datant de 2003 et
2004) participent au même but : rendre plus facile l’immigration vers le
territoire communautaire par l’harmonisation accélérée des politiques
d’immigration et d’asile. Depuis le traité d’Amsterdam en 1999,
l’immigration clandestine, le séjour irrégulier et le rapatriement des
clandestins sont tombés dans la compétence communautaire. Seule
l’immigration légale est encore (pour combien de temps ?) de compétence
nationale. –
The European Commission refuses to lock Europe in fixed borders.
Against the massive arrival of illegal immigrants on the European
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territory, the European Commission decided to create, on October 3rd
2005, FRONTEX, a European agency that manages the external borders of
the EU. This is a costly and derisory gadget.
All of the European immigratory directives (from 2003 and 2004)
contribute to a same goal: facilitate immigration toward the common
territory through an accelerated harmonization of immigration and asylum
politics. Since the treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, illegal immigration,
irregular stays, and repatriation of illegal immigrants are all within EU
competency. Only legal immigration is still (and for how long?) relevant
to domestic competency.” (Front National and Le Pen, 2007)
“Bruxelles n’est pas seule responsable. La France s’inscrit dans la même
logique d’ouverture des frontières, de suppression des monopoles d’État
et des services publics, de concurrence effrénée, d’élargissement de
l’Europe, de démantèlement de notre souveraineté. –
Brussels is not the only culprit. France subscribes to the same logic of
opening borders, suppressing state monopolies, encouraging unrestrained
competition, expanding Europe, and dismantling our sovereignty.” (Front
National and Le Pen, 2007)
In 2012, Marine Le Pen, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s daughter, takes on the leadership of
the FN. In the 2012 manifesto, her language is much more aggressive than her father’s,
and the blame on the EU is much clearer, even from the first few pages, where she
denounces the single currency policy’s failures. She accuses the EU of being responsible
for the economic crisis and for weakening France’s economy.
“Depuis 10 ans, l’euro, monnaie unique, n’a tenu aucune de ses
promesses. Son bilan est sans appel : explosion des prix, chômage,
délocalisations, dette. […] La France s’est déjà endettée de 60 milliards
d’euros pour renflouer la Grèce, l’Irlande et le Portugal. […] Rester dans
l’euro, c’est se condamner à mourir à petit feu. - For ten years, the single
currency Euro, has held none of its promises. Its assessment is irrevocable:
rise of the prices, unemployment, outsourcing, debt. […] France has
already taken on a debt of 60 billion Euros to assist Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal. To continue using the Euro is to condemn oneself to a slow
death.” (Front National and Le Pen, 2012)
Other arguments in the 2012 manifestos focus on European policies with
regards to agriculture, hunting, and fishing. The too-strict policies, the manifesto
states, endanger French people. Similarly, they criticize the “dogma of free and
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real competition” within the public sector and especially public service. Finally,
the “dogmatic European construction” is seen as “a complete failure”
To finish, the most recent manifesto, from 2017, is not outdone. Though it is
much shorter, its blame of issues on the EU are very clear. Along with discussing the
problem of immigration and that of the Common Agricultural Policy, the manifesto also
denounces a mismanagement of finances by the EU, wherein France has found itself
dependent upon the European Central Bank.
“Remettre de l’ordre dans nos finances publiques par la fin des mauvaises
dépenses publiques (notamment celles liées à l’immigration et à l’Union
européenne) […]. Sortir de la dépendance aux marchés financiers en
autorisant à nouveau le financement direct du Trésor par la Banque de
France. – We must rearrange our public finances and end bad public
spending (especially those linked to immigration and the European Union
[…]. We must escape the dependency upon financial markets by allowing
the direct financing of the Treasury by the Banque de France.” (Front
National and Le Pen, 2017)
Another interesting point in the manifesto is that of symbols, wherein Marine Le
Pen insists that we must showcase the French flag in all public buildings and “remove the
European flag” (Front National and Le Pen, 2017). This is a clear sign of the party’s clear
opposition to all forms of the European project as it stands.
All in all, those manifestos show the evolution in the way Europe was perceived
in the past two decades: from an original mistrust of the project and a suspicion that it
might lead to unintended consequences, the language and the rhetoric have evolved to
instead blame the European Union for problems that would have been a responsibility of
the state a few years before. Blame is very present in the most recent political
communications, and manifestos are but one example of the way this is expressed.
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Speeches and television interviews often offer an even stronger depiction of this rhetoric
of transnational blame.

Conclusion
Thorough this thesis, I have worked to find and propose an explanation for the
recent increase in electoral support for Eurosceptic parties, specifically looking at their
gain in the European Parliament. I have developed an argument based on the cleavage
theory, suggesting that a transnational understanding and description of issues may be
followed by an increase in Euroscepticism, especially if it is accompanied by a blame
turned toward the European Union rather than domestic institutions. Thorough a
statistical analysis that used indicators from the Manifesto Data Project to quantify
transnational blame (x), as well as the party vote shares for the last four European
Parliament elections to signify party success (y), I have discovered the presence of a
significant correlation between the two variables. In other words, I was able to prove that
the presence of transnational blame within a party’s rhetoric does impact the party’s
electoral success. Those findings can highlight the reasoning behind the changes in the
rhetoric of Eurosceptic parties and may have strong implications for European Union
politics.
The mistrust toward international organizations is, of course, nothing new.
Euroscepticism has been present and growing for years and so have other movements
opposing the expansion of international organizations. Nonetheless, the shift in the
rhetoric of blame that I described in this paper is more recent and its consequences might
be drastic, both from a policy and a theory perspective. The external crises that the EU
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has faced have contributed in worsening the internal crisis that scholars have been
continuously studying and that saw its first major consequence with the final withdrawal
of the United Kingdom in January 2020. Understanding how political parties make use of
these external crises to expand their support base becomes crucial to devising policies to
respond to the larger institutional crisis. As mentioned earlier, the European Union might
need to focus on methods to better communicate its successes as to mitigate the effects of
transnational blame and, instead, highlight the benefits of belonging to the Union.
On a more academic and theoretical basis, I was able to propose an explanation
for the continued growth of Euroscepticism, which scholars have known questioned for
years. Though rhetoric does not, obviously, tell the full story and does not fully account
for the success of Eurosceptic parties, it is important to acknowledge its crucial role in
helping the parties expand their support base in EU countries. Moreover, the phenomenon
of transnational blame that I identified and studied is not one that stops at borders and
there is much to be said about how it might impact other regions of the world.
Further research could focus on this pattern on a greater scale or in a different
area, which could contribute to confirming this research’s findings and conclusions, as
well as inform both the academic and the policymaking community on the future of
international organizations. Moreover, this thesis and its findings rely essentially on
indirect data, as the independent variable – transnational blame – is evaluated through
indicators from the Manifesto Data Project (Volkens et al. 2020). As discussed in the
analysis section of my thesis, this reliance on outside data caused certain limitations,
including in making the sample a bit small due to the absence of certain scores. Future
scholars could work on improving and re-testing the findings of this thesis through
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original data collection. In particular, it could be worthwhile to rely on a linguistic
analysis software to research keywords linked to the European Union and identify the
level of blame in given sentences. Through the results of the linguistic analysis, scholars
could obtain scores measuring the amount of transnational blame for a given party on a
given year and substitute these scores for the ones from the Manifesto Data Project. This
original data collection would allow for a more precise estimation of the level of
transnational blame and would potentially permit a further statistical analysis of the
correlation between transnational blame and party electoral success.
Future scholars could also add onto this research through original interviews,
either with party leaders or with their public relation advisors as to enquire about the
specific use of the rhetoric of blame and the evolution of their communication strategy.
This could be an excellent way to gain not only an understanding of the effect of that
rhetoric but also an insight into its construction. All in all, party rhetoric is a rich topic
and, as Euroscepticism continues to evolve, the prospects for research are numerous.
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Appendix

Figure 5 Pearson's product-moment correlation calculation for S109 and EP

Figure 6 Kendall's rank correlation calculation for S109 and EP

Figure 7 Pearson's product-moment correlation calculation for S110 and EP
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Table 2. Manifesto indicators and EP election results (imputed data)
Internationalism Negative (score)

5.3945*
(2.734)

European Union Negative (change)

1.7031**
(0.560)

Previous election results

0.8482***
(0.148)

Constant

0.4318
(2.091)

R2

0.615

Observations

30
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Table 3. Manifesto indicators and EP election results (existing data only)
Internationalism Negative (score)

15.6279*
(4.923)

European Union Negative (score)

-2.2785**
(1.273)

European Union Negative (change)

2.7996
(0.667)

Previous election results

0.7624**
(0.159)

Constant

4.2000
(3.120)

R2

0.808

Observations

15
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Table 4. Manifesto indicators and party results
S109

D109

S110

UK
Independence
Party
(UKIP)_2014

1.26
1

NaN

16.46
9

Conservative
Party
(Con)_2014

0.00
0

0.00
0

Democratic
Unionist Party
(DUP)_2014

0.00
0

Sinn Fein (SF)
"We
Ourselves"_201
4

D110

EP

DEP-1

DEP

EP-1

NaN

0.490000

10.68000
0

16.09000
0

26.77000
0

4.597

1.690

1.100000

3.690000

27.00000
0

23.31000
0

NaN

1.310

NaN

0.540000

0.080000

0.460000

0.540000

0.00
0

NaN

0.000

NaN

0.250000

0.010000

0.650000

0.660000

Brexit
Party _2014

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

Sinn Fein
(SF)_2014

0.16
4

0.16
4

0.164

-1.210

0.100000

8.320000

11.20000
0

19.52000
0

People Before
Profit Alliance
(PBPA)_2014

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

1.500000

National
Front/Rally
(FN/RN)_2014

1.34
7

0.28
6

5.051

-0.827

3.510000

18.56000
0

6.300000

24.86000
0

La France
Insoumise
(FI)_2014

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

French
Communist
Party
(PCF)_2014

NaN

0.00
0

NaN

0.000

1.992000

2.305500

3.888000

1.582500
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S109

D109

S110

D110

Left Front
(FdG)_2014

0.13
4

0.13
4

1.071

1.071

Galician
Nationalist
Block
(BNG)_2014

0.00
0

0.00
0

3.664

Voice (Vox V)_2014

NaN

NaN

Podemos
(Podemos)_201
4

0.00
0

United Left
(IU)_2014

DEP-1

EP

DEP

EP-1

NaN

0.130000

6.480000

6.610000

1.631

0.718750

0.728750

0.311250

1.040000

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

1.570000

NaN

0.000

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

7.980000

0.06
1

0.06
1

0.860

-0.579

0.471667

0.422143

1.855000

1.432857

Law and
Justice
(PiS)_2014

0.00
0

0.00
0

0.930

-0.223

14.73000
0

2.000000

27.40000
0

29.40000
0

League of
Polish Families
(LPR)_2014

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

14.82000
0

NaN

1.100000

NaN

Self-Defense of
the Republic of
Poland (SRP,
SO)_2014

NaN

0.00
0

NaN

0.000

9.320000

1.420000

1.460000

0.040000

UK
Independence
Party
(UKIP)_2019

1.75
6

0.49
5

3.426

13.04
3

10.68000
0

23.55000
0

26.77000
0

3.220000

Conservative
Party
(Con)_2019

0.00
0

0.00
0

1.738

-2.859

3.690000

14.45000
0

23.31000
0

8.860000
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S109

D109

S110

Democratic
Unionist Party
(DUP)_2019

0.00
0

0.00
0

3.464

Sinn Fein (SF)
"We
Ourselves"_201
9

0.00
0

0.00
0

Brexit
Party _2019

NaN

Sinn Fein
(SF)_2019

D110

EP

DEP-1

DEP

EP-1

2.154

0.080000

0.060000

0.540000

0.600000

0.518

0.518

0.010000

0.070000

0.660000

0.590000

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

30.79000
0

0.23
2

0.06
8

3.013

2.849

8.320000

7.840000

19.52000
0

11.68000
0

People Before
Profit Alliance
(PBPA)_2019

0.29
8

0.29
8

0.000

0.000

NaN

0.800000

1.500000

2.300000

National
Front/Rally
(FN/RN)_2019

0.83
7

0.51
0

0.837

-4.214

18.56000
0

1.520000

24.86000
0

23.34000
0

La France
Insoumise
(FI)_2019

1.17
0

NaN

2.242

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

6.310000

French
Communist
Party
(PCF)_2019

0.00
0

0.00
0

0.000

0.000

2.305500

0.907500

1.582500

2.490000

Left Front
(FdG)_2019

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

0.130000

NaN

6.610000

NaN

Galician
Nationalist
Block
(BNG)_2019

NaN

0.00
0

NaN

-3.664

0.728750

0.840000

1.040000

1.880000
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S109

D109

S110

D110

Voice (Vox V)_2019

1.97
6

1.97
6

0.000

0.000

Podemos
(Podemos)_201
9

0.00
0

0.00
0

0.174

United Left
(IU)_2019

0.00
0

0.06
1

Law and
Justice
(PiS)_2019

1.02
3

League of
Polish Families
(LPR)_2019

Self-Defense of
the Republic of
Poland (SRP,
SO)_2019

DEP-1

EP

DEP

EP-1

NaN

4.640000

1.570000

6.210000

0.174

NaN

2.630000

7.980000

5.350000

0.137

-0.723

0.422143

3.917143

1.432857

5.350000

1.02
3

3.098

2.168

2.000000

9.500000

29.40000
0

38.90000
0

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

NaN

1.420000

NaN

0.040000

NaN
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